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A B S T R A C T   
In Wallonia, Belgium’s southern region, the distribution component of the overall electricity retail tariff is 
essentially volumetric, i.e. based on the users’ energy consumption (in €/kWh). Residential prosumers, more-
over, are connected to the grid via a net-metering system. In this paper, we rely on a sophisticated multi-agent 
tariff simulator – developed in Manuel de Villena et al. (2019, 2020) – calibrated to this specific regional context 
to model the integration of prosumers into the distribution grid. This simulator enables us to highlight how the 
emergence of prosumers impacts the distribution network tariff, and to evaluate several tariff reforms currently 
under discussion: the introduction of a prosumer fee, the introduction of a capacity component and a switch to 
net-purchasing. Without a change in the metering system, short run reforms can only change the structure of the 
tariff paid, either to all consumers or to prosumers only. In the long run, especially thanks to smart meters, we 
consider both the introduction of a net-purchasing system and of a tariff with a capacity component. Our analysis 
highlights one key added value of smart meters: they allow network tariffs that are fairer and sustainable.   
1. Introduction 
Distributed electricity generation based on renewable energy sources 
has boomed globally in recent years. The deployment of this type of 
decentralized generation helps decarbonize the energy system. How-
ever, since distributed generation units are connected to the distribution 
network –traditionally designed to unidirectionally distribute electricity 
from the transmission network to residential areas– they induce chal-
lenges to the operation of the electricity system. In particular, they 
change the nature of energy exchanges within the distribution network, 
which are now bidirectional as households deploying solar photovoltaic 
panels on their rooftop not only import but can also export electricity. In 
light of this paradigm change, regulatory interventions related to how 
these flows are measured and priced are key in the emergence of a more 
sustainable energy system. For that reason, reforms of the distribution 
tariffs are on the agenda in many jurisdictions. 
The situation of Wallonia, Belgium’s southern region, is particularly 
interesting in many respects. Households have made substantial 
investments in decentralized energy production sources over the last few 
years. By the end of 2019, despite a relatively low solar irradiance, over 
10% of the households had installed solar photovoltaic (PV) panels and 
became prosumers. This large adoption of PV installations can be 
explained by two main factors: (i) subsidies and (ii) network regulations. 
First, generous up-front investment subsidies (either in the form of direct 
financial support or in tax cuts) as well as production subsidies, mainly 
via a green certificate system (Boccard and Gautier, 2015), were granted 
by various jurisdiction levels. Second, favorable network regulations for 
prosumers helped substantially decrease the electricity bills of PV 
owners at the household level. According to these network regulations, 
distribution tariffs in Belgium were (and still are) predominantly based 
on units of energy consumed, that is, volumetric fees typically in €/kWh. 
In addition, prosumers are integrated into the grid via a net-metering 
system, where the exports of electricity are registered by subtracting 
from the meter the units of energy injected into the grid (which in 
practice means that the solar production is valued at retail price). In such 
a context, investing in PV panels substantially decreased the prosumers’ 
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electricity bills, as their meters readings, and thereby their electricity 
bills, could be greatly reduced. 
This high take-up rate of PV adoption led to a tense debate in the 
public and political arena. From 2016 to 2019, 40 out of the 93 Energy 
Commissions of the Walloon Parliament discussed issues related to 
prosumers. Since 2018, all forms of subsidies have been phased out for 
new PV installations. However, the current network regulations have 
barely changed. One key issue facing the regulator is that Wallonia is 
lagging behind other European regions in terms of smart meter adoption 
(ACER/CEER, 2019): as yet, albeit there is a regional target coverage of 
80% of households by 2030, few smart meters have been installed 
(Service Public de Wallonie, 2018). This is 10 years behind the goal set 
by the 2009 Electricity Directive set at the European Union level. Hence, 
the mechanical single meters, i.e. the technology in place, limit the way 
distribution costs can be billed to the grid-connected users, and only the 
structure of the tariffs can be changed, e.g. by relying more on fixed fees 
rather than on volumetric ones. Fixed fees can be applied to all users or 
to prosumers only. The switch to new bi-directional meters for pro-
sumers (mechanical or smart) will make it possible to consider a 
different price for electricity imported from and exported to the grid, via 
a net-purchasing system. The roll-out of smart meters will in addition 
facilitate the introduction of capacity fees (based on units of power 
withdrawn from the grid, typically in €/kW). Facing a similar policy 
context in Flanders, Belgium’s northern region, The VREG, the energy 
regulator, decided to switch towards capacity-based tariffs starting from 
2022 on (VREG, 2020). 
This paper analyzes how different distribution tariff regulations 
impact the consumption, production, and (possibly) storage behaviors of 
residential households. For this purpose, we rely on a tariff simulator 
developed by Manuel de Villena et al. (2021) and we use 
regional-specific load and solar irradiance profile curves to apply the 
model to the case of Wallonia. Compared with other simulators used in 
Kubli (2018) or Schittekatte et al. (2018) to study a related research 
question, we use an agent-based modeling approach incorporating the 
region-specific consumption and production profiles of several thou-
sands of heterogeneous households. This simulator enables us to eval-
uate the impact of various changes in regulation with respect to PV and 
battery investments, the evolution of distribution network tariffs, the 
levelized value of electricity (LVOE) of prosumers and non-prosumers, 
as well as the formers’ rate of self-consumption, and the peak power 
withdrawals and injections. Our work highlights the importance of 
considering both the distribution tariff design and the technology con-
necting all electricity users to the network, as only a subset of tariff 
regulations can be implemented in the absence of smart meters. And, 
even if our simulations are computed to represent the specific situation 
of one region, our policy conclusions carry further away to other legis-
lations that want to adapt their distribution tariff to integrate distributed 
generation. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
literature on the integration of distributed generation into the grid. In 
Section 3, we describe the current distribution network regulations in 
place in Wallonia. The tariff simulator is presented in Section 4. Section 
5 analyzes the regulatory scenarios implementable with the metering 
technology in place. Section 6 describes the regulatory reforms and their 
impact that can be set in the long run with a change of meters. Section 7 
concludes our work. 
2. Literature review 
Our work relates to the literature focusing on the relationship be-
tween the emergence of decentralized generation units and the 
financing of the distribution system, in the context of an unbundled 
energy system. In the face of decreasing volumes of the electricity sales 
owing to the presence of prosumers, the distribution system operator 
(DSO) requires a higher distribution tariff level in order to break-even 
(Eid et al., 2014). However, as expounded by Brown and Sappington 
(2017) and Gautier et al. (2018), such a reform, in a context of largely 
volumetrically based tariffs, makes PV investments even more profit-
able, further leading to inefficiently large investments in solar PV. This 
unsustainable financing of the grid is often referred to as the utility 
death spiral (Simshauser, 2016). 
Our numerical model follows up on the works focusing on this 
feedback loop to analyze different distribution network regulations. 
While our conclusions are similar to the works previously done on this 
topic, we contribute to this literature by better fitting our model with 
respect to the policy context studied, the Walloon Region, on three 
different levels. 
First, compared to Schittekatte et al. (2018) and Schittekatte and 
Meeus (2020), we use an agent-based modeling approach that considers 
a large amount of residential households. The energy consumption and 
production profiles of 6000 heterogeneous households are considered. 
Thanks to this approach, we are able to make more realistic predictions 
regarding the decision to invest in PV panels and batteries, including 
regarding the size of these investments. Similar to the work of Kubli 
(2018), our simulator allows us to discuss how tariff regulations impact 
self-consumption and peak power withdrawals. In addition, we also 
analyze how peak power injections, a key cost driver for a DSO, are 
influenced by network regulations. 
Second, the policy setting is greatly influenced by the metering 
technology in place. The issue of death spiral is particularly important 
when a net-metering system is in place, as the energy exported to the 
grid is sold at the attractive retail price. This is the current metering 
technology in Wallonia.1 Hence, the simulator used in this paper is 
closely related to the ones developed by Darghouth et al. (2016), Cas-
taneda et al. (2017), Young et al. (2019) to analyze network regulations 
in respectively California, Colombia and New South Wales Australia.2 
Compared to these works, we differentiate the implementable regula-
tions in the short and long run, depending on the available metering 
technology. In the short run, only the tariff structure can be changed, for 
all or only a subset of energy users. In the long run, a net-purchasing 
system can replace the net-metering system to set different prices for 
the electricity imported from or exported to the grid. In addition, smart 
meters, will allow complex tariff structures such as capacity-based one. 
Hence, we believe that it is important to differentiate short run, second 
best, regulations from long run ones that can take advantage of the 
technological features of more evolved meters than those currently in 
place that record flows only with a single meter. 
Third, we calibrate our simulator to the context of Wallonia, though 
not just with respect to the solar irradiance and the typical production 
profile, as traditionally done in the literature. In this regard, our simu-
lator is parameterized in such a way that the impact of a distribution 
tariff increase on the decision to invest in a PV installation be similar to 
the one measured by Gautier and Jacqmin (2020) using PV installation 
data in Wallonia. 
We trust that these three key aspects allow robust policy conclusions. 
3. Distribution network tariff and the integration of residential 
solar PV in Wallonia 
Distribution tariffs in Wallonia have been regulated by the regional 
regulator (CWaPE) since 2014. The regulator uses a cost-plus method-
ology to fix the distribution tariff. There are 7 DSOs and 13 tariff zones, 
1 Note that a net-metering system is also in place in a majority of U.S. states, 
in European countries like Denmark, Netherlands, Greece, Hungary or Latvia as 
well as in various lesser developed countries like India or Brazil (see IEA-PVPS 
(2019)).  
2 In comparison, Martin and Rice (2018), Solano et al. (2018), Kufeoglu and 
Pollitt (2019) and Gunther et al. (2019) present a simulator suited respectively 
for Queensland Australia, Portugal, UK and Germany where a net-purchasing 
system, coupled with a feed-in tariff, is currently in place. 
M. Manuel de Villena et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Energy Policy 150 (2021) 112065
3
where the distribution tariff levels vary substantially between zones. The 
tariff structure, however, is similar in all zones, with a distribution tariff 
that is essentially volumetric (in €/kWh), and which includes very small 
fixed fees (around 20 € per household per year, covering the rental of the 
meter). The other components of the electricity bills (transmission, en-
ergy, taxes and other levies) are also based on the consumption level in 
kWh. Some retailers also include a relatively small fixed fee in their 
contracts. In 2018, the volumetric part of the distribution tariff ranged 
from 7.3 c€/kWh to 14.9 c€/kWh, with an average tariff equal to 11 c€/ 
kWh. In Wallonia, the distribution tariff represents 36% of the con-
sumer’s final electricity bill, including VAT (CWaPE, 2020); this rela-
tively large share can be explained, at least partially, by the large public 
service obligations imposed to the DSOs, which include public lighting, 
social energy tariffs, and the promotion of renewable energy integration. 
In Wallonia, almost all meters are mechanical and PV adopters 
connect their PV installation to the existing meter. Prosumers then have 
a single meter that runs forward when electricity is imported from the 
grid, and backward when it is supplied to the grid. To switch to net- 
purchasing with a different price for power injections and with-
drawals, prosumers need to change their metering technology. They can 
either install a second mechanical meter to register power injection or a 
smart meter. Smart meters can measure power in addition to energy, 
thus enabling the introduction of more sophisticated tariff designs such 
as adding a capacity-based component to the tariff.3 
Over the current regulatory period (2018–2022), the regulator 
introduced a prosumer fee in October 2020 (CWaPE, 2019). This fee is to 
be paid by the prosumers in contribution to the network costs. Such a fee 
is based on the PV capacity of each prosumer, and is computed to 
compensate the avoided distribution network fees assuming a 
self-consumption rate of 37.76%. Its level depends on the tariff zones, 
but is on average equal to 85 €/kWp. Prosumers have the option to 
opt-out and install a dual meter (net-purchasing) and pay the regular 
distribution tariff for their electricity imports.4 However, while it is 
useful to measure the concomitance of decentralized production and 
consumption, the roll-out of smart meters has been slow compared to the 
targets set at the EU level and the adoption rates of other Member States. 
The goal is to have 80% of users of the energy network equipped by 
2030.5 
4. Tariff simulator 
We rely on a multi-agent model to simulate the impact of distribution 
tariffs on residential consumers’ investments in PV modules and batte-
ries. The model is introduced in Manuel de Villena et al. (2019) and 
described in further details in Manuel de Villena et al. (2021). Appen-
dix 7.2 contains the mathematical formalization of the simulator. We 
present the main ingredients of this model in Section 4.1, and the main 
assumptions on which it relies in Section 4.2. We describe the simulated 
scenarios in Section 4.3. 
4.1. Model description 
This simulation-based approach relies on a discrete time dynamical 
system with two types of agents, the users and the Distribution System 
Operator (DSO), which interact with each other for a given regulatory 
environment. Users are classified into three categories of agents: con-
sumers, potential prosumers, and prosumers. The interaction between 
the different categories is represented in Fig. 1. 
The model is composed of several modules: an individual optimiza-
tion module (OPT) that for each potential prosumer computes the lev-
elized value of electricity (LVOE), given their consumption and 
production profiles and the regulatory environment in place. The LVOE 
differs from the traditional levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) in that the 
LCOE only accounts for costs (i.e. it is computed as discounted costs 
divided by discounted aggregated demand), whereas the LVOE accounts 
for costs and revenues (i.e. it is computed as discounted costs minus 
discounted revenue divided by discounted aggregated demand). The 
second module models the investment decision process (IDP), where the 
comparison between the LVOE of each individual potential prosumer 
and the retail electricity price determines the probability that they invest 
and become actual prosumers. The last module represents the remu-
neration mechanism (RM) of the DSO – it computes the adjustment of 
the distribution network tariff performed by the DSO as a consequence 
of PV (and/or battery) investment. In this regard, the tariff is adjusted so 
as to cover the costs of the DSO. 
Consumers and Prosumers: At the start of the simulation, there are 
no prosumers and all users draw electricity from the distribution 
network. However, as the simulation proceeds over the discrete time 
dynamical system, a subset of users, i.e. potential prosumers, take action 
to gradually deploy optimally sized PV installations and batteries, thus 
becoming prosumers. A potential prosumer turns into an actual pro-
sumer depending on the difference between the LVOE and the actual 
electricity costs without PV installation and on an exogenous probabil-
ity. We use the results of Gautier and Jacqmin (2020) to calibrate this 
probability. On the basis of data from residential prosumers in Wallonia, 
these authors estimate, by means of an econometric analysis, the elas-
ticity of investment in solar PV due to an increase in the volume-based 
tariff and, therefore, of the electricity price. They estimate that a 1 c€ 
increase in the price of electricity increases the probability of investment 
in a PV installation by 8%. We then created a scenario mimicking the 
conditions observed by Gautier and Jacqmin (2020), called baseline. In 
this scenario, an increase of 1 c€ in the price of electricity for the initial 
period leads to an increase in PV investment by 8%. Then from the 
second period on, this probability evenly decreases as the deployment of 
PV installations converges to 100% of the potential prosumers (see 
benchmark in Section 5). Once a user has invested, thus becoming a 
prosumer, this agent is removed from the subset of potential prosumers 
and added to the subset of prosumers, which prevents further invest-
ment from this particular user. 
DSO: The DSO is a regulated entity. The distribution tariff is set by 
the regulator and computed to a sufficient level so as to cover the costs 
deriving from the provision of the electricity distribution service. In our 
model, there is no explicit cost modeling for the DSO. We consider the 
distribution costs to be constant over time and equal to their historical 
value. Hence, we model the financing of the DSO as a zero-sum game: 
3 Smart meters still have other advantages that we do not consider here, e.g. 
the possibility of having time-of-use tariffs. As consumption is recorded almost 
instantaneously, the tariff can be adapted to follow the trends of the wholesale 
market price. Our scenarios do not consider such a pricing but only time- 
independent distribution network fees and electricity prices. For the time 
being, meters measure net consumption on a yearly basis. Negative meters 
could also be reset to zero on a weekly or monthly basis. Our main reason for 
not discussing these changes is that, to our knowledge, there is no discussion to 
date of implementing such tariffs in Wallonia. This standpoint might change in 
a foreseeable future as the Electricity Directive (Directive (EU) 2019/944) re-
quires Member States to implement dynamic electricity price contract when-
ever smart meters are installed.  
4 There is currently a disagreement between the regulator and the regional 
government on this prosumer fee. For political reasons, the latter wants to 
compensate the prosumers for the introduction of the fee. As of today, it is not 
clear how the government plans to do so, except that it wants corrective 
measures to encourage self-consumption.  
5 There are two other regions in Belgium. The situation in Flanders is very 
similar to the one in Wallonia where a prosumer fee has already been imple-
mented since 2015 (De Groote and Verboven, 2019). One key difference is that 
the roll-out of smart meters will soon be completed and that capacity tariffs, 
similar to the ones discussed here, will be implemented from 2022 on (VREG, 
2020). However, note that, in the energy decree modified in 2019, the Flemish 
government has committed to maintain the net-metering system as a way to 
value energy flows, for at least 15 years starting from the date of the PV 
installation. In Brussels, a densely populated region with mostly shared roof-
tops, PV investments have been scarcer and a net-purchasing system is in place 
where the import price of electricity is slightly higher than the export price. 
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the fixed cost of the DSO must be covered and the different grid tariffs 
will allocate relatively more or less of this cost to a category of con-
sumers or another. Prosumers’ investments in PV installations then 
change the revenues of the DSO, since these are less reliant on the im-
ports of electricity from the distribution network, but they do not change 
the grid costs.6 At every time step of the discrete time dynamical system, 
the DSO then is allowed to adjust the distribution tariff in order to cover 
its cost (i.e the DSO must break even and the regulator allows it to in-
crease the tariff to this purpose). The DSO, however, is constrained by 
the tariff structure, which cannot be changed. Tariff changes then 
impact electricity costs by typically increasing them, and hence the in-
centives to invest. Thus, there emerges a feedback loop between the 
prosumers and the DSO, which is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
4.2. Main assumptions 
Table 1 reports the main parameters used for running our simula-
tions. The parameters are calibrated to represent the tariff and electricity 
prices in Wallonia as well as reasonable estimates of PV and battery 
prices and their evolution. In addition, we use solar irradiance data from 
Wallonia and standard consumption profile curves for representative 
consumers for the region. These load profiles have been generated by 
detailing a household’s list of electric appliances and other character-
istics. In total, we generated 1000 load profiles, corresponding to 
different configurations of electric appliances and inhabitants per 
household using the CREST Demand Model (McKenna and Thomson, 
2016). These profiles represent 1000 potential prosumers. In addition, 
5000 consumers are introduced by using an average yearly load of 
consumers in Wallonia. Thus, the total population size is 6000 (5000 
consumers and 1000 potential prosumers). While potential prosumers 
may become prosumers over the time of the simulation, the 5000 usual 
consumers are regarded as the residual load of the distribution network, 
representing those users who cannot become actual prosumers due to 
technical or economic constraints. The set of potential prosumers and its 
size depend on the characteristics of both the habitations (apartment vs. 
houses, rooftop size and orientation) and the households (renters vs. 
owners, income, etc.). 
In Wallonia, around 40% of the houses are detached and 66% of the 
households are owners. There is, however, a lack of reliable data for PV 
adoption in Wallonia because all subsidies for solar PV installations have 
been phased out only recently (July 2018) and previous adoptions were 
massively subsidized. Hence it is difficult to benchmark it with historical 
data. The comparison with Flanders, a region that bears many institu-
tional similarities with Wallonia, makes us confident that our model 
provides a good approximation. There, subsidies were suppressed earlier 
and we observed that, on average, 0.8% of the households installed PV 
each year, during the period 2016–2018. This adoption rate was slightly 
increasing over the period and was 1.07% in 2018. If this rate is kept 
constant over 10 years, we would have that 10.7% of the households 
representing 64.2% of the potential prosumers turn to prosumers at the 
end of the estimation period. As Flanders applies a prosumer fee, the 
closest scenario to represent the situation in Flanders is the net-metering 
system with a prosumer fee (NMfee in the subsequent analysis). In our 
estimations, we find that around 90% of the potential prosumers turned 
to prosumers in this scenario. This makes us believe that the potential 
prosumer set is not undersized and the diffusion of PV investments ap-
proximates well historical data. 
The simulation-based approach is run for 10 periods, each of which 
corresponds to one year. At the end of each period, the simulation-based 
approach retrieves the amount of potential prosumers and of prosumers, 
the capacity of deployed PV panels and batteries, and the distribution 
tariff level, among other parameters (see Table 1 for a detailed list of the 
parameters). Then, the simulator starts the simulation of a new period 
Fig. 1. Multi-agent interaction model with the feedback loop created by the deployment of residential PV panels and by the DSO’s remuneration mechanism.  
Table 1 
Key parameters of the model.  
Commodity price (€/kWh) 0.132 
Initial distribution tariff (€/kWh) 0.088 
Selling price (NP) (€/kWh) 0.040 
Population size 6000 
Potential prosumers 1000 
Initial PV Price (€/kWp) 1500 
Initial battery price (€/kWh) 300 
Yearly change PV price (%) − 5 
Yearly change battery price (%) − 5 
PV lifetime (years) 20 
Battery lifetime (years) 8 
Charging rate (in C.) 4 
Discharging rate (in C.) 2.5 
Interest rate (%) 2  
6 In practice, the deployment of solar PV modifies the power injections and 
withdrawals on the grid and thereby impact the grid cost. We discuss further 
this issue in Section 6.3. 
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using as starting conditions, our exogenous parameters set initially and 
the endogenous parameters retrieved from the previous period. Table 1 
indicates the initial conditions used for the first step of the simulation. 
4.3. Simulated scenarios 
We use the simulator to generate six different scenarios, four with the 
net-metering (NM) system and two with the net-purchasing (NP) system. 
We consider different tariff structures, mixing fixed (Fix), volumetric 
(Vol), and capacity (Cap) elements for the distribution tariff. The 
selected scenarios discuss the most likely reforms of the tariff structure 
that are being considered in Wallonia. These scenarios are summarized 
in Table 2. The first three scenarios can be implemented with the current 
single meters whereas the other three require a change in the metering 
technology. Scenario 5 can be implemented by installing an additional 
mechanical meter to the one currently in place or a smart meter. In 
addition, smart meters also allow the implementation of scenario 4 and 
6 with the inclusion of a capacity component in the tariff. 
For each scenario, we report the following elements: (i) the per-
centage of potential prosumers who invested in solar PV and/or batte-
ries, thus becoming prosumers; (ii) the installed capacity of solar PV (in 
kWp); (iii) the installed capacity of batteries (in kWh); (iv) the mean 
LVOE of the prosumers; (v) the percentage increase in the electricity 
costs for the traditional consumers, calculated as the mean percentage 
increase among the traditional consumers; (vi) the percentage of self- 
consumption i.e. the share of electricity produced by the PV in-
stallations that is consumed on site by prosumers; the peak demand 
withdrawn from the network; and (vii) the peak production injected into 
the network. 
5. Benchmark and short-term reforms 
We set out considering three basic scenarios that can be easily 
implemented in the short-term, without a change in the metering 
technology. The current net-metering technology in place exclusively 
and mechanically registers the yearly energy net consumption. In this 
context, few reforms are possible. The simplest ones consist in re- 
balancing the structure of the distribution tariff bill to decrease the 
volumetric part, and as compensation, adding a fixed fee, either applied 
exclusively to prosumers or applied to all consumers. 
We consider the scenario baseline as a benchmark. This scenario 
simulates the current situation in Wallonia. We then consider two sce-
narios where, in addition, non-volumetric fees are introduced.7 In the 
first, prosumers pay a fee linked to the installed power of their PV 
installation (scenario NMfee). This reform is applied since October 2020 
on with an average prosumer fee of 85 € per kWp of PV installed. In the 
second scenario, there is a fixed fee imposed to all users, prosumers and 
consumers (scenario NMfix) alike. In this case, we consider that the fixed 
fee must cover 30% of the distribution network costs, the remainder 
being covered by a volumetric tariff. This threshold has been defined to 
match the average tariff structure currently applied in Europe (European 
Commission, 2015). 
As shown in Fig. 2, the baseline scenario is the more favorable one for 
PV investments given that the electricity generated by the PV panels is 
valued at the retail tariff, which includes the price of the commodity as 
well as the distribution/transmission fees and taxes. Unsurprisingly 
then, by the 5th of the 10 periods considered, nearly all potential pro-
sumers had already deployed a PV installation. Fig. 3 shows that this 
scenario is the fastest one to reach the full potential deployment of PV 
capacity. 
The large and rapid deployment of solar PV panels reduces the total 
consumption registered by the DSO (as the meter runs backward for 
prosumers) and, to cover the DSO costs, the volumetric fee, as well as the 
fixed fee for scenario 3 must be increased by the regulator. Fig. 4 shows 
that the overall cost of electricity increases by around 30% at the end of 
the 10 periods for traditional consumers. These consumers have to bear 
a larger proportion of the grid costs. As this upward change in tariff 
makes investing in a PV installation even more favorable to potential 
prosumers, the financing of the DSO is not sustainable and we can 
observe what is traditionally referred to as the utility death spiral. 
Introducing either a prosumer or a uniform fixed fee aims at 
decreasing the volumetric component of the distribution tariff, and 
hence the benefit of net-metering. Consequently, solar PV installations 
are less attractive and the rate of investment is, by and large, lower, as 
seen in Fig. 2. In Fig. 3, a similar trend is observed for the installed ca-
pacity of PV. In the NMfee scenario, the fee does not apply to the his-
torical installations but only to the new ones, which implies that the 
initial tariff is equal to the tariff in the baseline scenario. In this case, the 
distribution tariff increases less compared to the benchmark (see Fig. 4) 
because, on the one hand, there are fewer PV installations, and, on the 
other, prosumers pay a fixed fee that partially compensates the loss of 
revenue of the DSO due to the meter rolling backward. 
The prosumer fee reduces the rate of investment by prosumers. In the 
baseline scenario, over 80% of the potential prosumers have invested 
after two periods while in the NMfee scenario, less than 30% have made 
such an investment. By the end of the simulation horizon, in the NMfee 
Table 2 
Simulated scenarios.  
Number Scenarios NM/NP Tariff structure 
#1 Baseline NM Vol (100%) 
#2 NMfee  NM Vol(100%) + prosumer fee (85 €/kWh) 
#3 NMfix  NM Vol (70%), Fix (30%) 
#4 NMcap  NM Vol (50%), Cap (50%) 
#5 NPvol  NP Vol (100%) 
#6 NPcap  NP Vol (50%), Cap (50%)  
Fig. 2. Evolution of the share of prosumers among potential prosumers.  
7 We will focus on distributional issues between prosumers and traditional 
energy users. However, as, on average, low income consumers tend to consume 
less electricity, increasing the fixed part of the bill can be detrimental to low 
income consumers, who are also less likely to invest PV as they are typically 
tenants and face a binding financial constraint. This other dimension of the 
distributional issue can be problematic especially in the scenario NMfix. How-
ever, as discussed in Burger et al. (2020), it is possible to design fixed charges 
based on demand characteristics or income to mitigate the regressiveness 
related to fixed charges. 
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scenario, 90% of the potential prosumers have invested. This value, 
although similar to that of the baseline scenario, requires about six or 
seven periods more than the baseline scenario. Note that with an in-
crease in potential prosumer population, the final values for both sce-
narios would tend to differ more. Finally, the introduction of a uniform 
fixed fee (NMfix) hardly has an impact on the deployment of PV in-
stallations and simply serves as a re-distributive tool to share the grid 
costs between prosumers and traditional consumers differently. 
The key driver of these results is that the prosumer fee substantially 
increases the LVOE of PV installations, as pictured in Fig. 5. Especially, 
we can observe that, under the NMfee scenario, the mean cost is 81% 
higher than in the benchmark baseline scenario. With a uniform fixed 
fee, as in the NMfix case, the mean increase is limited to 27%. The cor-
ollary is that the cost for non-prosumers is lower in the NMfee and NMfix 
scenario compared to our benchmark case. Hence, the cross- 
subsidization of prosumers by traditional consumers via the grid 
financing system is lower than in our benchmark case. 
The following point still needs mentioning: in none of the three 
scenarios do we observe the deployment of batteries. Under net- 
metering, the grid acts as a giant storage facility since exporting elec-
tricity and storing it into a battery offers the same monetary value. In 
fact, deploying a battery will make the users lose some energy owing to 
the round-trip efficiency of batteries. In such a setting, residential bat-
teries offer no added value to this kind of investment, given that the 
price of electricity consumed and sold is the same. 
6. Long-term reforms 
Other metering technologies, like the installation of an additional 
meter to record the energy exported to the grid or a smart meter, allow 
for a larger set of feasible tariffs for financing the grid. They allow to 
price differently the imports and exports of energy. Smart meters can 
measure and record energy consumption not only on a yearly basis but 
also in short intervals, such as every 15 min, and be remote-controlled. 
As a consequence, they can record the peak consumption over the short 
interval measured (the shorter the interval, the more accurate the 
measurement). 
We consider two kinds of structural regulation taking advantage of 
these metering technologies. The first one looks into changing the tariff 
structure and allowing for capacity fees in addition to the traditional 
fixed and volumetric distribution tariff fees. The second one looks into 
the possibility of switching from a net-metering to a net-purchasing 
system. 
With net-metering, imports and exports of electricity are not differ-
entiated in terms of prices. Hence, there is no monetary incentive to self- 
consume and, as shown above, prosumers do not invest in residential 
batteries. By measuring electricity imports and exports separately, a net- 
purchasing system makes it possible to differentiate the prices of the two 
flows. This, in turn, changes the incentives to invest both in solar PV and 
storage systems. Furthermore, consumers may adapt their behavior to 
increase their self-consumption, e.g. by shifting demand to synchronize 
consumption and production. 
In the net-purchasing case, we consider that the price of exported 
electricity is equal to the average of the wholesale electricity price 
(around 40 €/MWh) and there is no distribution fee collected on 
exported electricity.8 The electricity imported by prosumers is charged 
at the same price as for traditional consumers. 
Fig. 3. Evolution of the installed capacity of PV installations.  
Fig. 4. Evolution of the total tariff bill of a consumer.  
Fig. 5. Evolution of the LVOE of PV installations.  
8 Increasing the purchasing price of electricity above the wholesale price 
increases the incentives to invest in a PV installation, but decreases the in-
centives to invest in a battery. With a purchasing price equal to the retail price, 
the net-purchasing scenario would be equivalent to the baseline scenario. At 
least, this would be so provided that the amount of electricity that can be 
exported is capped to the level of electricity consumed on a yearly basis. 
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6.1. Net-metering system with a capacity component 
In the NMcap scenario, the distribution tariff is half composed of a 
volumetric fee and half of a capacity fee. The capacity fee is based on the 
peak consumption (in kWp) recorded during the billing period. With a 
capacity fee, a battery can be used to shave the peak consumption by 
displacing consumption from peak to off-peak hours. This investment 
may drastically reduce the prosumers’ bills. In this scenario, prosumers 
are still connected to the grid via the net-metering technology. 
As shown in Figs. 6 and 7, the change in the tariff structure only 
slightly curbs the deployment of solar PV compared to the fully volu-
metric case presented in our benchmark baseline scenario. A major 
difference is that we now observe the deployment of batteries (see 
Fig. 8). This evolution, however, is rather limited in size and is only 
observed from period five on (due to lower technology costs and 
increasing volumetric charges). While the presence of a net-metering 
system provides no incentive to invest in batteries, we observe that 
batteries enable prosumers to shave their peak production, i.e. to 
decrease their electricity bill, which is partially capacity based. 
Compared to our benchmark, the capacity fee scenario (NMcap) in-
creases the LVOE for prosumers, but to a relatively lesser extent than 
when a prosumer fee is implemented, as considered under the NMfee 
scenario (see Figs. 5 and 9). In Fig. 10, the electricity tariff paid by 
traditional consumers increases almost in the same proportion as in the 
baseline scenario. This can be explained by the fact that non-prosumers 
do not have the possibility to displace their peak production by using 
batteries. Therefore we observe, as in the benchmark, that a larger 
fraction of the grid costs are paid by non-prosumers. 
6.2. Net-purchasing system 
A net-purchasing system can be implemented by the installation of 
an extra mechanical meter or of a smart meter. We consider two sce-
narios: a fully volumetric distribution tariff (NPvol), and a tariff 
combining capacity and volumetric terms (NPcap) with an equal contri-
bution of the two components to the grid costs. The latter is only possible 
in the presence of a smart meter. Thus, the tariff structure of NPvol is the 
same as in the baseline scenario and the one of NPcap is the same as in 
scenario NMcap. 
In Figs. 6 and 7, we observe that the two net-purchasing scenarios 
lead to a lower number of PV installations than under any net-metering 
system. At the end of the 10 periods considered, we find that 79% and 
85% of the potential prosumers have become actual prosumers under 
the NPvol and NPcap scenarios, respectively. The growth trend of the in-
vestments made is constant and similar across the 10 periods considered. 
In terms of deployed PV capacity, both scenarios display a similar total 
installed capacity. This is because a volumetric tariff induces a larger 
average installation size but fewer installations. 
Fig. 6. Evolution of the share of households with a PV installation.  
Fig. 7. Evolution of the installed capacity of PV installations.  
Fig. 8. Evolution of the deployment of batteries.  
Fig. 9. Evolution of the LVOE of PV installations.  
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The high deployment of batteries is another key difference between 
the net-metering and the net-purchasing scenarios, as Fig. 8 shows. 
Under the NPvol scenario, over 3000 kWh of batteries are installed, while 
under the NPcap scenario 5000 kWh of storage capacity is available. In 
addition to a slightly lower LVOE under the NPcap scenario than under 
the NPvol scenario (see Fig. 9), the different reasons behind the decision 
of investing in batteries explain the differences in the number and size of 
the batteries installed in these two scenarios. Under NPvol, batteries are 
installed because, financially speaking, it is more advantageous to store 
(and later consume) electricity than to sell it to the grid at selling price 
and later consume it at retail price. Under NPcap, in addition to the 
previous reasons, there are additional incentives to invest in storage as 
batteries help reduce the electricity bill by shaving the peak demand. 
This behavior, moreover, is rational and relatively simple to explain 
from the prosumer standpoint. 
Overall, switching to a new metering technology that differentiates 
the price of electricity imports and exports (i.e. net-purchasing instead 
of net-metering), as well as switching to distribution tariffs based 
partially on capacity components, leads to a lower amount of PV in-
stallations. This change can slow down our transition to a decarbonized 
energy system. However, the diffusion of panels is more even out over 
the years. The extent of the cross-subsidization of prosumers by tradi-
tional users via the financing of the grid is less present. Prosumers, be-
sides, are far more likely to invest in storage devices such as batteries, 
and the more so when capacity fees are in place. Finally, it is important 
to mention that the net-purchasing system offers an additional degree of 
freedom by making it possible to adapt the selling price of electricity. In 
our work, we have considered a rather small selling price, set at the 
commodity price (average wholesale market price). Choosing a higher 
selling price makes it possible to encourage more PV investments. This, 
though, would induce lower investments in storage devices and an 
increasingly unequal electricity bills between prosumers and consumers. 
6.3. Self-consumption and power exchanges with the grid 
Finally, for each scenario, we compute the average self-consumption 
rate. The share of self-consumed electricity corresponds to the total 
consumption minus the imports from the grid divided by the total 
consumption. By increasing self-consumption, peak consumption from 
the centralized energy system can decrease, which is known as being one 
of the main drivers of the grid costs (Passey et al., 2017). Promoting 
self-consumption is also important because power injections to the dis-
tribution network might be costly. Indeed, as production is correlated 
locally, there may be large power injections made by several prosumers 
at the same time in the same low-voltage feeder, e.g. at noon on a hol-
iday weekend, when decentralized production is high and consumption 
low. These power injections may cause over-voltages on the local dis-
tribution network, and the inverters to disconnect the solar PV from the 
network, inducing a loss for the prosumers. Furthermore, owing to 
prosumers’ excessive electricity injection, the DSOs might need to 
reinforce the distribution network, in which context self-consumption 
reduces the overall costs of the DSO. These investments might require 
new on-load tap changers, booster transformers, and static volt ampere 
reactive control compensator (IEA-RETD, 2014). Hence, while 
self-consumption is not necessarily a goal in itself, it can be beneficial for 
the grid by decreasing peak consumption from the grid and peak in-
jection to the grid. 
The self-consumption rate is usually lower for residential households 
than for commercial activities (Clastres et al., 2019). Moreover, there is 
a high discrepancy in Wallonia between production and consumption: in 
the summer months, production is the highest and consumption the 
lowest and conversely in the winter months. Despite the lack of financial 
incentives, around 40% of prosumers claim to take actions to synchro-
nize their consumption and production. According to Gautier et al. 
(2019), this is mainly true for those who tend to spend more time during 
daytime at home as, for instance, retired people. 
We do not explicitly model the impact of self-consumption, via a 
change in aggregated peak consumption and injection, on the grid costs. 
Nevertheless, we compute the self-consumption rate for each of the six 
scenarios and the corresponding peak power withdrawals and in-
jections. Focusing only on prosumers, we measure these two variables as 
the maximum aggregated amount of electricity withdrawn or injected 
over a 1 h period among the yearly profile. Table 3 presents the figures. 
It shows that the net-metering system does not promote self- 
consumption; all three net-metering scenarios present a self- 
consumption rate close to 30%. Aggregated peak power withdrawals 
and injections are marginally differing, except for the NMcap where 
lower peak power withdrawals are observed due to the capacity 
component (peak shaving behaviors). 
A switch to the net-purchasing system implies an increase in the self- 
consumption rate from 30% to 46–50%, which can easily be explained 
by the presence of batteries. As a consequence of promoting self- 
consumption, aggregate peak power withdrawals and injections are 
also decreasing. Under the NPvol scenario, the two peaks decrease by 
respectively 0.76% and 4.62% compared with the baseline scenario. 
When coupled with a capacity component, a net-purchasing system is 
able to decrease the peaks more substantially by 64.2% and 18.95% 
(withdrawals and injection, respectively). 
Hence, a net-purchasing system with capacity-based tariffs can 
substantially decrease the grid costs by shaving the import and export 
peaks. Compared to the baseline scenario, the peak demand and the 
peak injection decrease by respectively 60% and 19%. In the present 
paper these metrics can be measured only from a physical standpoint, 
with no associated monetary value of the reduction in the grid costs. 
Note, however, that these gains are possible thanks to private in-
Fig. 10. Evolution of the total tariff bill of a consumer.  
Table 3 
Self-consumption and aggregate power exchanges.   
Absolute Self-consumption Peak Power Peak Power 
Scenarios value Rate withdrawals injections 
baseline 1776.89 kWh 29.67% 2806.90 kW 4975.55 kW 
NMfix  1780.35 kWh 29.72% 2805.65 kW 4975.55 kW 
NMfee  1775.98 kWh 29.65% 2808.54 kW 4975.55 kW 
NMcap  1623.91 kWh 27.11% 2682.68 kW 4967.99 kW 
NPvol  2809.44 kWh 46.91% 2784.24 kW 4745.83 kW 
NPcap  2997.92 kWh 50.05% 1004.53 kW 4032.66 kW  
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vestments into batteries rather than a collective effort from the DSO. 
Those cost reduction for the DSO could be passed through consumers 
under the form of a lower grid tariff. Under this NPcap scenario, these 
financial investments made by prosumers are estimated at around one 
million euros. If this figure from our model is extrapolated to the size of 
Wallonia, we have that households’ investments in batteries will amount 
to 600 million euros to reduce grid costs. Overall, to judge the efficiency 
of the tariffs we would need to balance more precisely these private 
investments made by prosumers into batteries and the reduction in grid 
costs they create. 
7. Conclusion and policy implications 
This study has aimed to assess the impact of various tariff regulations 
and metering technologies on the evolution of the electricity system and, 
in particular, the electricity distribution network in a case study applied 
to Wallonia, the southern region of Belgium. Findings expressed in 
comparison to the baseline scenario (describing the current situation in 
Wallonia) are summarized in Table 4. They suggest that choosing be-
tween a net-metering and a net-purchasing technology to measure the 
imports and exports of electricity from/to the distribution network is 
critical. The net-metering system highly enhances the adoption of PV 
installations, which is one of the primary energy targets in the European 
Union, compared to the other scenarios. However, this comes at a cost. 
Regardless of the distribution network tariff structure considered, net- 
metering does not incentivize investments in battery installations at 
all and, therefore, does not encourage self-consumption. Peak power 
withdrawals and injections are decreased under a net-purchasing sys-
tem, in particular when capacity-based fees are applied. Net-purchasing 
and capacity-based tariffs tend to strongly complement each other. 
Moreover, the net-metering technology leads to largely differing elec-
tricity bills for prosumers and non-prosumers, where non-prosumers 
end-up bearing most of the costs of the DSO. This issue can potentially 
impair the acceptance of electricity generation technologies coming 
from renewable energy. 
7.1. Policy implications 
The CWaPE, the energy regulator in Wallonia, pursues various ob-
jectives relating to: (i) economic efficiency, (ii) equity, and (iii) the 
stability of the revenues of the DSO; moreover, the CWaPE aims at (iv) 
designing distribution tariffs that pave the way for the energy transition. 
Where the net-metering technology is in place, only the latter objective 
is partially fulfilled as it encourages large investments in PV production 
sources. This situation, however, is unsustainable as the network costs 
are financed by non-prosumers who see their electricity bills increase. 
The goal of the regulator is not to financially support investments in 
renewable production sources but to facilitate the energy transition via 
regulations targeting the DSO. As other tariff regulations only margin-
ally change these results, our analysis leads us to conclude that a net- 
purchasing system should be adopted. If, in addition, a capacity 
component is introduced in the tariff, less investments would be 
required to reinforce the grid as such a system substantially decreases 
peak power withdrawals and injections. As these changes would require 
smart meters, we highlight the need to deploy this technology more 
urgently than currently planned by the regulator. This would shorten the 
gap between short and long run policies, the latter of which enables the 
implementation of more adequate regulations. 
One reason for the relatively high electricity bills in Wallonia is that 
they do not only cover the costs of the commodity and the distribution 
network. The bills also charge users for various public policies, such as 
subsidies for investments in renewable energy production sources, 
reduced energy prices for precarious households, for the financing of 
public lighting, or the costs of the planned nuclear phase-out (CWaPE, 
2020). As distribution tariffs are computed on a volumetric basis, 
considering these additional costs to compute the electricity bills makes 
the system even less sustainable financially and prone to un-even allo-
cation of those additional costs where prosumers may end up not paying 
for public services such as lighting. All these public policies should be 
financed by the public finance system. This, in addition, would be a 
much more transparent and democratic procedure as they would fall 
under parliamentary oversight. Changing the financing sources of these 
policies would decrease the pressing concerns of a utility death spiral 
and equity issues between prosumers and traditional consumers. 
Finally, this analysis shows the importance of designing holistic 
policies supporting PV adoption and regulating the electricity distribu-
tion network, both concerning tariffs and metering technology, so as to 
facilitate a sustainable energy transition. 
7.2. Limitations and future research 
Our model relies on various assumptions relating to prosumers and 
the grid, which could influence some of our results. Yet, we believe that 
extending the model to consider these assumptions would lead to 
qualitatively similar results. To fully examine them, future research will 
be needed. 
In our model, potential prosumers are presumed to choose to invest 
in a PV installation or in both a PV and a battery installation. As a 
consequence, early PV adopters do not have the opportunity to later 
invest in an additional battery system. Allowing for this possibility 
would not impact the scenarios considered in the short run, i.e. where a 
net-metering system is in place, as anyway no investment in batteries is 
done. However, in the net-purchasing cases considered in the long run, 
both investments in PV and in batteries would increase. Changing this 
assumption would further strengthen the main conclusion of our 
analysis. 
Our model considers a wide, yet for simplicity’s sake, fixed variety of 
consumption load profiles. It is unlikely, though, that they will not 
evolve over time. For example, owing to the deployment of electric 
vehicles, consumption profiles are likely to change. While electric ve-
hicles increase consumption, they also act as a storage device potentially 
enabling peak shaving. As the functionalities of their batteries are 
similar to those of an ordinary battery, considering evolving load pro-
files would lead to lower investments in batteries in the long run sce-
nario with a net-purchasing system or a net-metering system with tariffs 
with a capacity component. The ensuing higher consumption levels 
would lead to a greater deployment of PV installations along with even 
larger rebates on the energy bill. Overall, taking these aspects into 
consideration would not qualitatively impact the key insights of the 
current simulator. 
One final limitation deserves to be mentioned. In this paper, we 
model the financing of the network grid as a zero-sum game. Further, we 
have shown that some grid regulations, and especially capacity tariffs 
coupled to a net-purchasing system, lead to a decrease in peak power 
imports and exports. These collective benefits can be translated into 
lower grid costs that are possible thanks to the private investments into 
batteries by prosumers. We hope that further research will allow a more 
precise quantification and comparison of these aspects. 
Table 4 
Summary of the results (evolution compared to the baseline scenario).   
NMfix  NMfee  NMcap  NPvol  NPcap  
PV adoption = – – - - - - 
Battery installations = = + ++ ++
Energy cost for non-prosumers – - - - - - - - - 
Peak power withdrawals/injections = = – – - -  
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Appendix 
The tariff simulator used in this paper is composed of three elements: (i) an optimization framework to size prosumers’ installations comprising PV 
and/or batteries; (ii) an investment decision process that controls the decision of prosumers to deploy the optimally sized DER installation; and (iii) the 
remuneration mechanism that computes costs and revenues of the DSO and adjusts the distribution network tariff accordingly. 
Optimization framework 
This element of the tariff simulator is used to optimally size prosumers’ DER installations according to various input parameters, notably the 
network tariff structure and network rates (e.g. 100% volumetric fee at 23c€kW), the technology costs (price of the PV panels and the batteries per 
kWp and kWh respectively), or selling price of electricity surplus. This optimization framework is instantiated in the form of a mixed integer linear 
program (MILP) where the binary variables are used to control the piecewise linear investment costs as well as the battery mode (charge or discharge). 
Such an MILP minimizes the LVOE of each prosumer’s DER installation, and finds the optimal sizing configuration in terms of PV and battery ca-
pacities. The formulation is laid out in the following way: 
Given the space of sizing variables A = {(p, b)
⃒
⃒
⃒p∈ [0, p]; b∈ [0, b]} denoting the space of sizing variables containing: PV size (p) in kWp, battery size 



















ρ(+)t ⋅ Π(sp), ∀y ∈ Y (2)  
χ = p ⋅ P(pv) + Y
B
⋅ b ⋅ P(bat) + τ(pv) ⋅ Q(pv) + τ(bat)⋅Q(bat) (3)  
p≤ p⋅τ(pv) (4)  
b≤ b⋅τ(bat) (5)  
υy = ξy ⋅ Π(vol) + γ ⋅ Π(cap) +Π(fix), ∀y ∈ Y (6)  











ρ(− )t , ∀y ∈ Y (9)  
ρ(− )y ≤ γ ≤ U(c)t , ∀t ∈ T (10)  
kt = p⋅U(p)t , ∀t ∈ T (11)  
j(− )t ≤ b⋅
1
F(− )




, ∀t ∈ T (13)  
j(− )t ≤ b⋅σt, ∀t ∈ T (14)  
j(+)t ≤ b ⋅ (1 − σt), ∀t ∈ T (15) 
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U(c)t + ρ(+)t + j(+)t = kt + ρ(− )t + j(− )t , ∀t ∈ T (16)  








+ j(− )t ⋅η(− ),∀t ∈ T \{0}




T  Set of time-steps comprising each year of the optimization with t ∈ {0,…,T − 1}
Y  Set of years comprising the optimization horizon with y ∈ {0,…,Y − 1}
Parameters  
Q(pv) Deployment costs of PV 
Q(bat) Deployment costs of battery 
P(pv) Scaling costs of PV per kWp installed 
P(bat) Scaling costs of battery per kWh installed 
Πot  Sum of energy and transission costs, and taxes in €/kWh 
Πsp  Selling price of electricity surplus for prosumers €/kWh 
Πvol  Volumetric term of the distribution tariff €/kWh 
Πcap  Power (capacity) term of the distribution tariff €/kWp 
Πfix  Fixed term of the distribution tariff €/consumer 
η(− ) Battery charge efficiency 
η(+) Battery discharge efficiency 
F(− ) Battery maximum charge rate 
F(+) Battery maximum discharge rate 
B Battery lifetime in years 
U(c)t  Time-series of consumption 
U(p)t  Time-series of production 
p  Maximum PV potential per prosumer 
b  Maximum battery potential per prosumer 
R Discount rate  
Decision variables  
P PV capacity deployed in kWp 
B Battery capacity deployed in kWh 
Х Investment costs of a single DER installation 
ρ(− )t  Imports of energy of a prosumer 
ρ(+)t  Exports of energy of a prosumer 
ξy  Yearly energy consumption of a prosumer in kWh 
Γ Peak demand of a prosumer in kWp 
υy  Yearly distribution costs 
ψy  Yearly transmission and taxes costs 
my  Yearly operation and maintenance costs 
kt  PV output of a prosumer in Kw 
j(− )t  Energy flow into the battery 
j(+)t  Energy flow out of the battery 
ϖt  State of charge of the battery 
ζy  Revenue of a prosumer from electricity surplus sales  
Auxiliary variables  
τ(pv) Binary variable enforcing the deployment costs of PV 
τ(bat) Binary variable enforcing the deployment costs of battery 
σt  Binary variable controlling the status –charging or discharging– of the battery  
Investment decision process 
The previous MILP is run for each of the potential prosumers in the set I = {1,…,I}, at each time-step of a dynamical system denoted by N = {0,
…,N − 1}. This MILP returns the LVOE of each potential prosumer, which is the objective function, as well as the optimal sizing configuration leading 
to this LVOE, given the input parameters specified previously. For an accurate description of these parameters the reader is referred to Manuel de 
Villena et al. (2021). For simplicity, let MILP(inputs) denote the general objective function of the MILP presented in the previous section, depending on 




MILP(inputs),∀(i, n) ∈I × N (19)  
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A*i,n = arg min
A∈A
s.t.(2) − (18)
MILP(inputs),∀(i, n) ∈I × N (20) 
where LVOEi,n represents the LVOE of prosumer i at time-step n and A*i,n represents the optimal sizing configuration of PV in kWp and battery in kWh 
leading to this LVOE for these input parameters. 
The investment decision process is run for each potential prosumer to compute the transition from potential to actual prosumer. This computation 
requires comparing the electricity costs per kWh of the prosumer with and without DER installation, for some level of distribution tariff. The electricity 
costs per kWh with the DER installations is the LVOE, the electricity costs per kWh without the installation, denoted Λi,n can be computed according to 











,∀(i, n) ∈I × N , (21)  
where Π(ot)n represents the sum of transmission costs and taxes at time-step n, Π
(vol)
n represents the volumetric term of the network tariff at time-step n, 
Π(cap)i,n represents the capacity term of the network tariff for user i at time-step n, Π
(fix)
n represents the fixed fee at time-step n, γ
(o)
i,n is the original peak 
demand of the user, and U(c)i,n,t is the hourly (assuming that T = 8760) demand of potential prosumer i at time-step n. 




, ∀(i, n) ∈I × N . (22) 
In this equation, Γi,n will adopt a value in [0,1] since Λi,n must be strictly positive assuming the aggregated demand of the potential prosumer is 
strictly positive, and since LVOEi,n cannot be greater than Λi,n by design of the MILP. The continuous value of Γi,n is then introduced to bias the value of 
the parameter pi,n of a Bernoulli random variable B(1, pi,n) such that: 
pi,n =
( (




,∀(i, n) ∈I × N , (23)  
where α is the exogeneous probability mentioned in Section 4.1, which is calibrateded to ensure that 1€cent induces an investment in PV of 8% as 
observed in Gautier and Jacqmin (2020). 





,∀(i, n) ∈I × N . (24) 
The value of this variable will be either 0, indicating that the potential prosumer will not deploy the DER installation, or 1, indicating that the 
potential prosumer will deploy it, turning into an actual prosumer. The probability of randomly selecting 1 will directly depend on the ratio Γi,n – if the 
ratio is close to 1, the probability pi,n of drawing 1 will be low, and conversely, if the ratio is close to 0, the probability of drawing 1 will be high. After 







. (25)  
Remuneration mechanism 
At every time-step n, the DSO remuneration mechanism ensures that any economic imbalances are translated into a network tariff adjustment. To 














Π(fix)n ⋅ (I + I0)
]
∀n ∈ N , (26)  
where I0 represents the consumers (i.e. non prosumers) of the distribution network. γi,n represents the optimised peak demand of the ith user, output of 
the MILP. Ω represents the residual demand of the system, which is an input of the simulation and is held constant throughout the entire simulation 




ρ(− )i,n ∀n ∈ N , (27)  
where ρ(− )i,n represents the optimised imports of the ith potential or actual prosumer at the nth time-step, which is an output of the MILP. 
Assuming that the demand of consumers and prosumers is constant over time, at the beginning of the simulation, the revenue can be computed R− 1, 
as there are no actual prosumers in the system. This level of revenue is assumed to cover DSO costs without any economic imbalance (i.e. revenue 
equals costs). Thus, the costs, denoted Θn are assumed equal to the revenue at the beginning of the simulation (Θ− 1 = R− 1). However, as potential 
prosumers gradually turn into actual prosumers, an imbalance Δn emerges on account of the energy not paid by actual prosumers. This imbalance is 
computed as: 
Δn =Θn − Rn, ∀n ∈ N . (28) 
Then, the different components of the distribution network tariff are updated according to the following equations: 
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⋅ μ3 ∀n ∈ N . (31) 
In these equations, μ1,μ2, and μ3 represent the share of the volumetric, capacity, and fixed fee, respectively, imposed by the DSO’s remuneration 
strategy, and therefore by the regulatory framework set by the regulator. These shares comply with 
∑3
j=1μj = 1. Finally, to compute the costs Θn we 
assume that the last observed state is conserved from n to n+ 1, and then updated. Hence, Θn = Rn− 1, where Rn− 1 is recomputed at every n according to 
equation (26). 
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Simshauser, P., 2016. Distribution network prices and solar PV: resolving rate instability 
and wealth transfers through demand tariffs. Energy Econ. 54, 108–122. 
VREG, 2020. Tariefmethodologie voor distributie elektriciteit en aardgas gedurende de 
reguleringsperiode 2021-2024. 
Young, S., Bruce, A., MacGill, I., 2019. Potential impacts of residential PV and battery 
storage on Australia’s electricity networks under different tariffs. Energy Pol. 128, 
616–627. 
M. Manuel de Villena et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
